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the commonalities and differences in the relationships among municipal govern-
ments, contractors, and local residents in Korea and Japan through the use of
survey data. We observed several common elements between the two countries
regarding the relationship between municipal governments and nonprofit con-
tractors. However, the relationships between nonprofit contractors and local res-
idents were quite different in each country because of their different local self-
governing environments. The second is to identify the current types of local resi-
dents’ participation in contracting-out, and to categorize them into inclusion of
local residents as members of contractors, participation of local residents in gov-
ernance mechanisms, open meetings, and involvement of local residents as vol-
unteers. The final aim is to ascertain whether there are statistical differences
between the respondents’ perceptions in the two countries regarding the effects
of local residents’ participation on service responsiveness. Using an independent
sample t-test analysis, we verified that Japanese municipal managers had more
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, major developed countries have faced mounting pressures to
overcome their declining economies and financial deficits, which have resulted in a
shift toward smaller government via new tools such as privatization and contracting-out
(Kim, 2000). Korea and Japan experienced similar pressure to pursue administrative
reform in the public sector in order to reduce government inefficiencies and improve
services. As a result of these pressures, many public services, such as refuse disposal and
social services, have been contracted out to the private sector. A great deal of literature
has demonstrated that contracting-out has become one of the most pervasive service
provision tools at both central and local government levels, and has gained a significant
degree of legitimacy (Kettl, 2000; Brudney, Fernandez, Ryu, and Wright, 2005). Accord-
ing to the Ministry of Public Administration and Security of Korea (2008), social ser-
vice contracting with nonprofits is now the most popular form of contracting-out in
Korea and Japan. As a result, the role of nonprofit organizations in social services pro-
vision has greatly expanded.
Nevertheless, there is a shortage of systematically collected empirical data on
social service contracting with nonprofits. First, much of the previous work has been
conceptual, prescriptive, and case specific rather than empirical and based on primary
data collection, and it has scarcely focused on the relationship between nonprofits and
local residents, although there has been an increase in empirical studies on the govern-
ments-nonprofits contracting relationship (Van Slyke, 2003; Brown & Potoski, 2003a,
2003c; Kang, Kim, Lee, & Ryu, 2009; Lee, 1998; Hwang, 2005; Yang, Hsieh, &
Shiun, 2009).
Second, much of the literature regarding contracting-out as a means of privatiza-
tion has emphasized cost savings and efficiencies through competition as the most
important dimension of contracting performance under the New Public Management
(NPM) trend. However, for social service delivery systems in particular, contracting-
out was introduced to improve the quality of services by using the expertise and expe-
rience of the private sector rather than to save costs and lessen inefficiency. Recent
studies point out that service quality is as important a dimension of contracting perfor-
mance as cost savings and efficiency, or a more important dimension especially in
regard to social service contracting (Boyne, 1998; Fernandez, 2009; Mun & Yun,
2006; Lee, Lee, & Lee, 2006). Some literature also empirically demonstrates that
competition and contracting performance may not be directly related, especially in
relation to social service contracting with nonprofits (Lamothe & Lamothe, 2009).
Third, past studies have suggested various variables as the determinants of con-
tracting performance, such as competition, asset specificity, service measurability,
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legal and organizational institutions, and public management capacity (Kelman, 2002;
Brown & Potoski, 2006; Van Slyke & Hammonds, 2003; Hefetz & Warner, 2004).
However, few studies have been conducted to show that collaboration or partnership
between contractors and local residents are also important components of contracting
performance, particularly with regard to the quality of services.
Previous contracting studies based on NPM perspectives may be criticized for not
doing enough to promote the idea of collaboration or partnership between local resi-
dents and municipal government (Box, 1999; Vigoda & Golembiewski, 2001). While
NPM has proved to be an advance over the classic views of public administration that
see residents as subjects or voters, it is still very limited in fostering the idea of collab-
oration and partnership between local governments, contractors, and local residents,
which are the essence of democratic civil society (Terry, 1998). Although NPM point-
ed out the importance of residents’ participation for more responsive service delivery,
it focused on their role not as partners (Vigoda, 2002a), but as clients.
Focusing on the role of local residents’ participation in social service contracting-
out, and based on local governance and partnership theories, this article will provide
various empirical findings about the current relationship between municipal govern-
ments, nonprofit contractors, and local residents in Korea and Japan. Though there
have been ongoing arguments about the costs and benefits of resident participation in
the service delivery process (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004), we will focus on the advan-
tages of resident participation for more responsive service delivery.
In this paper, the term residents will be interchangeable with citizens, because there
is only one relative difference between them: the term residents emphasizes regional
characteristics more than citizens does (Lee, 2005). Local residents can be defined as
citizens who reside within a local government jurisdiction and also as users of local
services. We define resident participation as resident actions that incorporate the
demands and values of residents into public services, and that take part in public ser-
vice provision processes as nonprofessional community members.1 Based on new
governance perspectives, we explore the current status of local residents as partners,
and their participation with municipal governments and nonprofits as a means of
improving the quality of contracting services in Korea and Japan.
The first section of this article shows Japan and Korea’s common elements and dif-
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1. This study uses local residents’ participation as an influential variable for more responsive
service delivery in social service contracting with nonprofits. Although it also examines the
current status of collaboration between municipal governments and local residents, the
focus is on the partnership between nonprofits and local residents. We emphasize both the
organizational and individual level of local residents’ participation.
ferences in terms of relationships among municipal governments, nonprofit contractors,
and local residents, using survey data. Unlike countries in North America and Europe
that are based on Christian traditions, Korea and Japan have long been based on Con-
fucian traditions and have adopted state-led development strategies. Due to these dif-
ferent cultural traditions, the contracting practices and experiences of the United States
and Europe may not automatically be applicable to South Korea or Japan. In addition,
we must consider that differences in contracting practices might exist between the two
countries as a result of distinct national histories, and in spite of their similar Asian
cultural traditions. The second section identifies the current types of local residents’
participation in contracting-out, and categorizes them based on four variables. The
final section investigates whether there are statistical differences between respondents’
perceptions in the two countries regarding the effects of local residents’ participation,
using an independent sample t-test analysis.
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL BACKGROUND
From New Public Management to New Governance
One branch of NPM seeks to eliminate inefficiency in government by moving
many government functions to the private sector (Savas, 2000). Hood (1991) coined
the term based on two forms of managerial reform: new managerialism and new insti-
tutional economics (Frederickson & Smith, 2003). New managerialism refers to the
introduction of private sector management methods to the public sector. It stresses
hands-on professional management, explicit standards and measures of performance,
managing by results, and value for money. New institutional economics refers to intro-
ducing incentive structures into public service provision. It stresses disaggregating
bureaucracies, greater competition through contracting-out and quasi-markets, and
customer choice. Kim (2011) argues that the main ideas of NPM, such as clientalism
and service user satisfaction, can be related to the New Governance (NG)—especially
local governance—perspective. Since a great deal of literature notes that the term new
governance is popular but quite imprecise (Frederickson, 2005; Lynn, Heinrich &
Hill, 2001), we must define it and specify its scope.
NG can be broadly defined as “institutions designed to exercise collective control
and influence” (Peters, 2000). But we try to follow a narrower definition of NG. Rhodes
(1997) defines NG as “self-organizing, inter-organizational networks” and argues that
these networks complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for
authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and coordination. Some
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scholars argue that networks were already a pervasive feature of service delivery sys-
tems, and that such networks were characterized by trust and mutual adjustment,
undermined management reforms rooted in competition, and were a challenge to gov-
ernability because of their autonomous nature and resistance to central guidance (Stoker,
1998).
Although NPM may be related to NG in its focus on clientalism and service user
satisfaction, NG scholars have identified several weaknesses associated with the busi-
nesslike managerialism of NPM (Rhodes, 1997; Peters & Pierre, 1998). First, NPM
adopts an intra-organizational focus, which concentrates on value for money, hierar-
chical control, and clear distribution of authority and responsibility. This perspective
pays little attention to managing inter-organizational links or to negotiating shared pur-
poses within contexts of little or no hierarchy of control (Jessop, 1997).
Second, NPM focuses on results rather than process. While NPM focuses almost
exclusively on developing intra-organizational management techniques that ensure
customer satisfaction and efficiency, NG is largely concerned with observing and
interpreting the processes through which techniques evolve, as well as the relative
clout of the actors involved. Because no one actor is responsible for an outcome in an
inter-organizational network, NPM is inappropriate for managing inter-organizational
networks and, more importantly such networks undermine NPM with its intra-organi-
zational focus on objectives and results.
The final weakness is that competition is based on a low level of interdependence
between several stakeholders, but it makes networks unstable and results in a lack of
the trust necessary to develop a negotiated equilibrium. Since the purpose of this arti-
cle is to examine the relationship between municipal governments, nonprofit contrac-
tors, and local residents in inter-organizational contracting networks, we will adopt the
NG perspective, using local governance as a broad theoretical framework.
Responsiveness to Local Residents as the Core Dimension of Contracting 
Performance
Contracting performance is a multidimensional concept that captures important
aspects of a service provider’s performance on a contract. Most studies consider cost,
efficiency, and service quality as three essential dimensions of contracting performance
(Boyne, 1998; Greene, 1996; Lavery, 1999; Warner & Hebdon, 2001). Fernandez
(2009) presented contracting performance as having eight dimensions: actual cost in
comparison to projected cost, actual cost in comparison to in-house service delivery,
quality of work, responsiveness to the government’s requirements, timeliness, service
continuity, compliance with the law, and customer satisfaction.
Social Service Contracting-Out in Korea and Japan 149
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
The reason we should divide contracting performance into multiple dimensions is
that these dimensions differ substantially and possess inherent tensions. Empirical
results generally suggest that only some contracting services have achieved cost sav-
ings, and these cost savings have not been accompanied by efficiency or quality gains
(Hodge, 2000). Some scholars even argue that cost savings are achieved at the expense
of service quality (Kamerman & Kahn, 1989). Therefore, these multiple dimensions
are treated as separate indicators without forming an aggregated overall measure,
assuming they may relate to contracting capacities in different ways (Fernandez, 2009;
Yang, Hsieh, & Shiun, 2009). Due to the tradeoff between multiple dimensions of con-
tracting performance, many studies confine their consideration to only one or two core
dimensions of contracting performance.
Much of the previous literature regards contracting-out as a means of privatization,
and has emphasized cost savings and efficiencies through competition as the most
important dimension of contracting performance. However, considering that contract-
ing in social service areas was introduced to improve the quality of services by using
the expertise and experience of the private sector, we have to discriminate social service
contracting from other types (Lamothe & Lamothe, 2009).
In so-called hard services, such as garbage collection or sewage treatment, which
have high levels of asset specificity and service measurability, costs or efficiency are
more important than quality. On the other hand, recent studies mention that, for social
service contracting-out in particular, service quality is as important a dimension of
contracting performance as cost savings and efficiency, or perhaps even more important
(Fernandez, 2009; Yang, Hsieh, & Shiun, 2009; Mun & Yun, 2006; Lee, Lee, & Lee,
2006; Lamothe & Lamothe, 2009).
As we are interested in social service contracting, this article will focus on the quali-
ty-of-service dimension of contracting performance. But this dimension will be
improved by subdividing it into more specific dimensions, following the example of
Fernandez (2009). According to his classification, quality of work, responsiveness to
the government’s requirements, timeliness, and customer satisfaction can be placed
under the category of service quality.
Meanwhile, a number of studies have started to take an interest in responsiveness
to service users as a core element of various performance dimensions, noting its utility
in improving service qualities. Therefore, as a dependent variable, we will focus on
responsiveness to local residents’ demands. Verba and Nie (1972, p. 300) define
responsiveness as “a relationship between citizen and government, one in which the
citizen articulates certain preferences and/or applies pressure on the government and
the government in turn attempts to satisfy these preferences.” Ostrom (1975, p. 275)
defines it as “the capacity to satisfy the preferences of the citizens.” Overall, respon-
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siveness is mainly concerned with satisfying residents’ demands and preferences.
Since NPM has increased pressure on state and local bureaucracies to become
more responsive to residents, it forces bureaucracies to confront a growth in clients’
passivism, and tends to favor the easy chair of customers over the turmoil of collabo-
rative participation (Vigoda, 2002a).2 On the other hand, NG pays profound attention
to matters that transcend the borders of government, and where governmental struc-
tures coordinate and give direction to collaborative public-private efforts (Kooiman,
1993). Based on NG perspectives, collaboration and partnership between government
and residents should be stressed to define responsiveness, as well as speedy and accu-
rate response to clients and customer satisfaction.
Previous literature has considered various operational indicators as measures of
responsiveness: speed, accuracy, timeliness, accessibility, convenience, comfort, fair-
ness, expertise, reliability, efficiency, relations with residents, response to residents’
demands, hospitality, transparency, and customer satisfaction. According to Wagenheim
and Reurink (1991), responsiveness is composed of timeliness-such as in answering
phone calls or questions and providing services promptly, as well as processing a pur-
chase order, inquiry, or complaint. Thomas and Palfrey (1996) use speed and accuracy
to measure responsiveness. Che (1997) considers speed, accessibility, response to resi-
dents’ demands, and transparency as responsiveness measures. Park (2001) disaggre-
gates responsiveness into accessibility, convenience, speed, accuracy, comfort, and
fairness as core indicators of evaluation for service quality. Gwon (1997) use more
specific indicators—expertise, fairness, efficiency, speed, accuracy, reliability, response
to residents’ demands, relations with residents, and convenience—to measure respon-
siveness for improving service qualities. Kim (2000) suggests that responsiveness,
which means service satisfaction, can be measured by speed, convenience, and hospi-
tality. Park (2001) uses accessibility, convenience, speed, accuracy, hospitality, comfort,
and fairness as core indicators of evaluation for service quality. Lee and Fan (2010)
suggest that core indicators of responsiveness are hospitality, speed, fairness, and cus-
tomer satisfaction.
In sum, whereas some indicators—such as speed, accuracy, timeliness of response,
and client satisfaction—may be derived from an NPM perspective, other indicators—
such as accessibility to networks, reliability, relations with residents, and fairness—
may be derived from an NG perspective. We divided indicators of responsiveness to
resident demands into two categories: quality of services and service users’ satisfaction.
Service quality has been defined as “a form of attitude,” related to but not equiva-
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2. Although the NPM perspective also emphasizes responsiveness, it has focused on respon-
siveness to residents not as active partners but as passive clients.
lent to satisfaction, that results from the comparison of expectations with performance
(Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1988). Other literature argues that service quality
and satisfaction are distinct constructs, and satisfaction is an antecedent of service
quality (Bitner, 1990). The most common explanation of the difference between the two
is that perceived service quality is a form of attitude, a long-run overall evaluation,
whereas satisfaction is a transaction-specific measure (Bolton & Drew, 1991). We
measured the former by speed, accuracy, timeliness, convenience, hospitality, response
to residents’ demands, reliability, transparency, and relations with residents, and the
latter by resident satisfaction, based on previous studies (see table 1).
Local Residents’ Participation as a Factor Influencing Contracting 
Performance
Previous research has suggested external factors such as competition, service char-
acteristics, and institutions, and internal factors such as government’s public manage-
ment capacity as the determinants of contracting performance. Since contracting was
introduced as one form of privatization, much of the literature has argued that compe-
tition is the most critical factor of contracting performance (DeHoog, 1984; Ferris &
Graddy, 1986; Song, 2005). Based on a public choice perspective, proponents of this
view stated that competition can minimize the inefficiencies of government monopo-
lies and lead to improved contracting performance.
Van Slyke (2003) defines competition as “a market containing a range of provider
alternatives from which government can decide who is best positioned to deliver con-
tract services with the highest quality, lowest cost, and greatest expertise.” However, the
relationship between competition and contracting outcomes is empirically complex and
is likely to involve tradeoffs between various dimensions of performance (Fernandez,
2009).
Contracting performance can also be affected by service characteristics (Brown,
Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006). Williamson (1981) suggests that two broad service char-
acteristics that impel transaction costs are asset specificity and service measurability.
Asset specificity refers to the need for physical infrastructure, technology, knowledge,
skills, and abilities that can only be acquired through on-the-job experience or highly
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Table 1. Our Measures of Responsiveness
Quality of services
speed, accuracy, timeliness, convenience, hospitality, response to residents’ 
demands, reliability, transparency, public relations to residents
Residents satisfaction service users satisfaction 
specialized investments. Service measurability refers to how easily and well public
managers can assess the quantity or quality of services. Based on principal-agent theo-
ry, Brown & Potoski (2003b) demonstrate that asset-specific and difficult-to-measure
services make governments vulnerable to unscrupulous vendors who may exploit their
information advantage by lowering service quality and quantity.
Another factor affecting contracting performance can be legal and organizational
institutions, which can be defined as the “rules of the game” (North, 1991). From an
institutional perspective, Yang, Hsieh, & Shiun (2009) explain that the importance of
legal and organizational institutions results from governance inseparability, a concept
similar to path dependence (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999).
Many recent studies emphasize the role of public management capacity, since
external factors mentioned above can eventually be managed by government capacity
(Brown & Potoski, 2006; Milward, 1996; Seidenstat, 1999). Brown, Potoski, & Van
Slyke (2006) state that acquiring and nurturing physical infrastructure, financial
resources, and more importantly, human capital is required for building contract man-
agement capacity.3
But scholarly attention to the role of contract management capacity is a relatively
recent phenomenon; thus, there is no consensus on exactly what managerial compo-
nents are critical for successful contracting. Though some substantial efforts have been
made to identify the core components of contract management capacity, empirical
results analyzing the effect of public management capacity on contracting perfor-
mance are quite mixed. For example, Lamothe and Lamothe (2009) verify the positive
Social Service Contracting-Out in Korea and Japan 153
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
3. Based on the contracting process, Brown & Potoski (2003a, 2003c) divide contract manage-
ment capacity into three categories that are related to a government’s ability to effectively
manage vendors: (1) feasibility assessment capacity to properly determine whether to make
or buy, (2) implementation capacity to effectively execute and manage contracts, and (3)
evaluation capacity to accurately and thoroughly evaluate contract performance in order to
ensure accountability. Lamothe and Lamothe (2009), based on the study of Ingraham,
Joyce, & Donahue (2003), consider three managerial components of public management
capacity: (1) leadership to set priorities and to coordinate activities, (2) the degree of inte-
gration and coordination among contracting units, and (3) the experience and expertise of
the contracting staff. Yang, Hsieh, & Shiun (2009), expanding the research of Brown &
Potoski (2003a, 2003c), suggest four aspects of contract management capacity: (1) agenda-
setting capacity to appropriately determine whether to make or buy, (2) formulation capaci-
ty to effectively set a fair bidding process, identify the best-fit contractor, and reach an
excellent contract, (3) implementation capacity, concerned with the actual production of
goods or the delivery of services, and (4) evaluation capacity to evaluate contract perfor-
mance to ensure accountability.
effect of public management capacity on contracting performance in their model tests,
while Fernandez (2009) empirically demonstrates that public management capacity is
not directly related to contracting performance. Examining the relationship between
management capacities and contracting performance, he finds that it appears to be
more complex than previously hypothesized, because of interactions with moderating
variables such as vendor type and contract duration. Some experts have also noted that
monitoring expenses can be considerable, and therefore these expenses should be fac-
tored into the total cost of purchasing services before determining the efficiency of
contracting-out (Rehfuss, 1989). In addition, the effectiveness of monitoring may depend
on the characteristics of contractors or the nature of the service being outsourced.
In sum, past studies have suggested that various internal and external variables are
responsible for affecting factors related to contracting performance, but few studies have
been conducted to show that collaboration and partnership between contractors and local
residents (or between municipal governments and local residents) are also an important
factor of contracting performance, especially in the responsiveness dimension.
To discuss the role of local residents’ participation on responsiveness, it is necessary
to review previous studies on resident participation. Resident participation has long
been a subject of active discussion in the field of political and administrative sciences
as one part of citizen participation. Citizen participation is often defined as “a citizen
action that influences or seeks to influence policy decisions” (Nagel, 1987), “an action
that incorporates the demands and values of citizens into public administration ser-
vices” (Zimmerman, 1986), “a process wherein the common amateurs of a community
exercise power over decisions related to the general affairs of a community” (Cun-
ningham, 1972), or “an action for providing residents with opportunities to take part in
policy process” (Glass, 1979).
Synthesizing those definitions, we define resident participation in this research as
resident actions that incorporate the demands and values of residents into public ser-
vices and that take part in the public service provision process as nonprofessional
community members. In general, citizen participation, including resident participation,
can be classified into two categories: political participation, such as voting in elections
or getting involved in political proceedings, and administrative participation, such as
demanding or keeping a close watch on administrative operations. Traditionally, politi-
cal forms of participation—including initiative, referendum, recall, petition for audit,
and petition for disbanding of local councils—have all been regarded as essential ele-
ments for the development of democracy (Lee, 2005). But recently, interest in admin-
istrative participation is increasing, because local residents can be seen as participatory
partners or collaborators of local government or nonprofits in day-to-day public ser-
vice delivery.
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This article limits its discussion to administrative participation of local residents in
social service contracting systems—which can be called participatory governance
(Gaventa 2004), citizen-centered governance (Andrews & Shah, 2005), or state-in-
society governance (Migdal, 1994)—because our focus is on the important role of
local residents’ participation in service contracting-out based on the NG perspective
and on partnership theory.
Scholars have described various types of resident participation. Arnstein (1969)
has developed an influential typology of resident participation, and argues that partic-
ipation is valuable to the extent that the redistribution of power enables the have-not
residents to be deliberately included in the future. She also posits a “ladder” of
empowerment with eight steps: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placa-
tion, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. But her classification has been
criticized as a defective analytic tool, because it improperly fuses an empirical scale
that describes the level of influence individuals have over some collective decisions
with normative approval (Fung, 2006).4 Vigoda (2002a) presents an evolutionary con-
tinuum of the role of residents, government, and public administration authorities, and
their reciprocal interaction, and illustrates that residents may be seen as subjects, vot-
ers, clients, partners, and owners. Based on his continuum, this article focuses on local
residents as partners.5
Many scholars argue that resident participation in a Jeffersonian democracy will
produce more public-preference decision making on the part of administrators and a
better appreciation of the larger community among the public (Stivers, 1994; Old-
field, 1990). Much of the public management literature maintains that collaborative
partnerships are a positive factor to be pursued by managers, since they are the new
form of governance (McGuire, 2006). Agranoff and McGuire (2003) stress that col-
laborative governance builds collaboration and partnerships among private and non-
profit organizations, and gives strong support to networks of organizations for public
service delivery. Meier and O’Toole (2003) demonstrate that frequency of interaction
is positively related to school district performance; the greater the number of actors
with whom the superintendents networked and the greater the level of interaction, the
higher the performance.
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4. There may be contexts in which public empowerment is highly desirable, but there are others
in which a consultative role for members of the public is more appropriate than full citizen
control.
5. However, this study is different from Vigoda’s (2002a). Unlike our definition of responsive-
ness as including collaboration based on an NG perspective, he differentiates responsive-
ness from collaboration based on an NPM perspective.
Of course, there are ongoing arguments over the disadvantages of resident participa-
tion in the service delivery process as well (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004).6 Some studies
have empirically demonstrated that public sector performance is negatively related to
resident involvement (Vigoda, 2002b). Therefore, a great deal of recent literature has
changed focus to address the conditions under which resident participation may be
costly and ineffective and when it can thrive and produce the greatest gains in effec-
tiveness (Howell, Olsen, & Olsen, 1987; Beierle, 1999; Innes, Gruber, Neumann, &
Thompson, 1994). In this regard, we will identify whether the benefits of resident par-
ticipation for more responsive service delivery are bigger than the costs in the case of
social service contracting-out in Korea and Japan, using respondents’ evaluations to
make our judgment.
History, Legal Institutions, and Current Status of Contracting-Out in Korea
and Japan
The 1990s economic crisis pushed the national governments of both Korea and
Japan to initiate a privatization policy with contracting-out as the most common
reform tool. In both countries, contracting-out was seen as a major tool for reforming
government and making it more efficient and productive. The reform attempted to
reduce the size of the bureaucracy, introduce competition to government, and make
government accountable and customer-oriented (Park, 2004). All these were in line
with the Anglo-American reform model based on NPM perspectives. National govern-
ments of Korea and Japan mainly contracted out operational services and pressed local
authorities to contract out their services using financial mechanisms (Hodge, 2007).
Park (2004) argues that the strong administrative culture of the two countries means
that governmental core activities and strategic functions are rarely contracted out for
public service delivery. The next sections offer a brief outline of the history, current
status, and related legislation regarding contracting-out in Korea and Japan respectively.
Korea
With the economic crisis in 1997, the incoming administration of Korea, led by
President Kim Dae-Jung, expressed its strong will to reduce the size of the bureaucracy.7
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6. Unless resident participation is structured adequately, it can cause an undue burden on resi-
dents because of the time and other sacrifices required to participate. Costs may rise and fall
depending on the location, duration, and required time and resource investment (Cooper,
1979).
7. Since 1970, the governments of the two countries had used a form of contracting-out to 
In 1998, the Committee of Planning and Budget of Korea set up the Guidelines on
Using the Private Sector for Providing Public Services, and included contracting-out
as one of Ten Guidelines for Budget Planning. According to the guideline of invigorat-
ing the contracting-out of government functions, the Korean Ministry of Government
Affairs and Home Affairs established the Annual Contracting-out Plans of Local Gov-
ernments. The Kim Dae-Jung government promised that it would reduce its bureau-
cracy by 20 percent during the four-year period from 1998 to 2001. This was applied
to all government agencies across the board, and meant local governments needed to
reduce their staffing levels.
After implementing an early retirement measure, local governments contracted out
many of their social welfare services in order to satisfy the mandated reduction target.
As for the general departments, the Ministry of Government Affairs and Home Affairs
of Korea is in charge of contracting-out. It sends the guidelines for contracting-out to
each ministry every year and makes the final decision on contracting-out based on pre-
liminary selection reports written by each ministry. So it is largely up to each ministry
to decide which services, as well as how many services and activities, are to be con-
tracted out. For social services, the Ministry of Health and Welfare is responsible for
social service contracting-out at the central level. Additionally, most of the Health and
Welfare Bureau, the Woman and Family Affairs, the Welfare and Woman’s Policy
Bureau, and the Self-Governing Bureau of each local government are in charge of
social service contracting-out at the local level.
Legislation on contracting-out includes Article 96 of the Constitution, Article 6 of
the National Government Organization Act, Article 104 of the Local Government Act,
and Article 10-16 of the Rule on Delegation and Entrustment of Administrative
Authority, a presidential decree. In addition, local governments set up their own ordi-
nances for contracting-out. The guidelines for implementing contracting-out of public
services in local governments enacted by the Ministry of Government Affairs and
Home Affairs of Korea can be included in those legal frameworks (Kang, Kim, Lee,
& Ryu, 2009). Legislation concerning nonprofit organizations includes the Nonprofit-
Nongovernmental Organization Support Act of 1999, the Regulation for Establish-
ment and Supervision of Incorporated Nonprofits, and the Act on Establishment and
Operation of Public Interest Corporations.
The percent of contracted-out services has been greater at the local level than at the
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enhance the efficiency of production by increasing competitive pressures on suppliers, and
to reduce the size of the government sector. But the contracting-out of public services
increased rapidly in the 1990s as one of the methods of administrative reform to lessen
financial deficits.
regional or national level, since the majority of services are provided by local govern-
ments. Local governments contracted out most social welfare and recreational ser-
vices, as well as wastewater treatment, garbage collection, and garbage incineration
(Park, 2004). According to an e-mail survey on public service contracting-out con-
ducted by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security of Korea (n=2,890, of
which 2,800 replied), over 2,700 public services had been contracted out as of 2008.
Social welfare services with nonprofits (about 30 percent) are the most contracted-out
form in Korean local governments. More than one in three cases of contracting-out is
related to social welfare services (about 40 percent), and most municipal governments
(about 73 percent) contract out various publicly operated social welfare facilities to
nonprofits, which include daycare centers for children, general welfare centers, centers
for the homeless, rehabilitation institutes, centers for the elderly, and centers for the
handicapped. Athletics and youth services also are often contracted out.
According to Article 6 of the National Government Organization Act, an adminis-
trative agency may contract out surveys, inspections, verifications, management, and
other services that are not directly related to the rights and duties of citizens, to a
juridical person that is not related to local government, but rather a corporation, orga-
nization, or its organs or other related individuals, following the conditions determined
applicable by the Acts and subordinate statutes. Accordingly, it is possible for admin-
istrative agencies to contract out to third-party organizations, their organs, or other
related individuals. But administrative agencies of Korea have instead only contracted
out to private corporations (interview with the manager of Suwon-city).
Nonprofits related to social service contracting-out can be divided into two types:
incorporated nonprofits and public interest corporations (Kim, 2000). Incorporated
nonprofits (beyoungri bupin) are registered organizations set up under Article 32 of
the Civil Law, the Private School Act, the Medical Act, the Social Welfare Activity
Act, or any other relevant establishment acts that seek to support nonprofits in their
pursuit of various social and economic objectives.8 Public interest corporations (gongik
bupin) are defined either by the Act on Establishment and Operation of Public Interest
Corporations or by Article 12 of the Act on Inheritance and Transfer Tax. The former
only includes legally established foundations and associations with scholarly, philan-
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8. The Civil Law sets the legal foundation for the formation of nonprofits. Associations or
corporations in the field of science, religion, charity, arts, social interactions, or otherwise
not engaged in profit activities may be established subject to permission from a relevant
supervising ministry (Article 32 of the Civil Law). Incorporated nonprofits that wish to
enjoy tax privileges must be established under the relevant acts, and must be recognized by
the National Tax Office (Kim, 2000).
thropic, and academic funding and activity areas, and they are subject to close govern-
mental monitoring. The latter is a broader term used in the context of an organization’s
tax status and describes a subset of nonprofits. It includes public interest organizations
that were created by obtaining permission from relevant ministries.
The Implementing Act on Inheritance and Transfer Tax lists the following types of
public interest corporations: religious organizations and private schools created by
either the Education Act or the Private School Act, social welfare service organiza-
tions created by the Social Welfare Service Act, hospitals created by the Medical Act
or the Mental Welfare Act, organizations created by the Act on Establishment and
Operation of Public Interest Corporations, cultural and arts organizations, organiza-
tions involved in public health and environmental protection, community centers or
any similar public-use facilities, and any other organizations that are designated as
public interest corporations by the prime minister. Based on their legal or institutional
status, we categorize nonprofit organizations as the contractors of social services into
incorporated nonprofits and public interest corporations (see table 2).9
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9. These public interest corporations receive special status with respect to inheritance and
transfer, corporation, and estate taxes and certain excise taxes. Therefore, they are required
to submit reports on their activities, including balance sheets and annual business plans.
More than incorporated nonprofits, public interest corporations tend to maintain a close
relationship with the state (Kim, 2000).
10. The Implementing Act on Inheritance and Transfer Tax of Korea recategorized public
interest corporations into private school corporations (n=1,749), social welfare corpora-
tions (n=2,830), religious corporations (n=17,958), academic corporations (n=3,163), art
and culture corporations (n=673), medical care corporations (n=610), and others (n=1,922)
as of 2009 (National Tax Office, 2009). Of these categories, private school corporations,
social welfare corporations, religious corporations, and others are related to social service
contracting-out.
Table 2. Nonprofits in Social Service Contracting in Korea10
Type Legal basis Number
Incorporated nonprofits
Article 32 of Civil Law, Private School Act, Medical Act, 
Social Welfare Activity Act, other relevant establishment acts
19,203
Public interest corporations
Act on Establishment and Operation of Public Interest Corporations 
or Article 12 of Act on Inheritance and Transfer Tax
28,905
Source: National Tax Office of Korea, 2009.
Japan
In the late 1990s, Japanese local governments faced an urgent need to conduct
administrative reforms in order to eliminate financial deficits accumulated from the
late 1980s to the mid 1990s. In July 1997, the Local Decentralization Promotion Com-
mittee, an advisory body to Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, recommended that
new administrative reform guidelines be established so as to secure the smooth imple-
mentation of local governments’ administrative reform programs. The Ministry of
Home Affairs prepared these guidelines in 1997. Since then, several cabinet decisions
on administrative reform in local governments have been issued, including the Decen-
tralization Promotion Plan in 1999, the Basic Principles for Administrative Reform in
2000, the Basic Policy on Structural Reform in 2001, the Regulatory Reform Action
Plan in 2003, and the Policy on Administrative Reform in 2004.
To accelerate the Policy on Administrative Reform, the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications (MIC)11 prepared new guidelines in 2005 and advised local gov-
ernments to make intensive reform plans covering the next five years. Based on the
2005 MIC guidelines, every local government made five-year intensive reform plans,
with the contracting-out of public facilities or public programs serving as their main
objective.12 As for the general departments concerned with contracting at the national
level, the MIC is in charge of preparing the guidelines for contracting-out and for send-
ing them to every local government. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare is
responsible for social service contracting-out at the central government level.
Legislation concerned with contracting-out to nonprofits includes the Constitution,
the Local Autonomy Law, the Civil Code, the Act on General Incorporated Associa-
tion and Foundations, the Act on Authorization of Public Interest Incorporated Associ-
ations and Public Interest Incorporated Foundation, and the Law to Promote Specified
Nonprofit Activities. In addition, the Act on Private Schools, the Social Welfare Act,
and the Religious Corporation Act exist as individual acts. Japanese local governments
also set up their own contracting-out ordinances, similar to Korea’s. Currently in
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11. The MIC was created on January 6, 2001 by the merger of the Ministry of Home Affairs,
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and the Management and Coordination
Agency.
12. The Japanese constitution adopts the principle of local autonomy just as the Korean constitu-
tion does. Every local government is autonomous from the central government and is respon-
sible for public tasks in its jurisdiction. When the central government would like to promote
administrative reform in the local governments, it can only offer guidelines. But as the cen-
tral government has some power to allocate tax funds to local governments, the local govern-
ments usually follow its guidance. Local governments also prepare their own administra-
tive reform programs based on the guidelines of the central government.
Japan, most local governments (over 50 percent) have contracted out their services to
nonprofit organizations under the local government reforms, focusing on the changing
needs of national governments (Tsukamoto & Nishimura, 2006; Keizai Sangyo
Kenkyjo, 2007). Therefore, most local governments have recently searched for ways
to collaborate and partner with local nonprofits in order to solve local issues and
improve local public services.
According to a postal survey on public service provision conducted by Nikkei
Newspaper (n=97 local authorities replied) in 2008, and a national postal survey on
nonprofit organizations (n=951, of which 373 replied) conducted by the Cabinet
Office of Japan in 2004, most collaboration and partnerships in public service provi-
sion (over 80 percent) take the form of contractual relationships. Nonprofit organiza-
tions are often selected as the contractors in the contracting-out of social welfare ser-
vices such as facilities for the handicapped, the elderly, and the youth and daycare
nurseries. According to the 2004 Cabinet Office survey, more than 90 percent of social
welfare facilities have been contracted out to nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit orga-
nizations as the vendors of social services can be classified as public interest institu-
tions, specified nonprofit corporations, and local self-governing bodies.
The traditional nonprofit corporations known as public interest corporations (koueki
hōjin) were institutionalized with the enactment of the Civil Law of 1897 during the
early Meiji Era. Public interest corporations of Japan fall into two categories: incorpo-
rated associations (shadan hōjin) and incorporated foundations (zaidan hōjin). Public
interest corporations have recently faced radical changes resulting from public admin-
istration reforms seeking to clearly distinguish the two types of corporation and assess
whether they are working toward the public benefit or not. Existing public interest cor-
porations were legally required to choose between being classified as a public interest
association or foundation, which benefits from tax advantages, or as a general associa-
tion or foundation, which receives little or no tax advantage, by the end of year 2008.
Traditional public interest corporations can be categorized as incorporated public
interest associations or foundations under the Act on General Incorporated Associa-
tions and Foundations or as incorporated general associations or foundations under the
Act on Authorization of Public Interest Incorporated Associations and Public Interest
Incorporated Foundations. The total number of these traditional nonprofit organiza-
tions is currently estimated to be over 200,000 (Tsukamoto & Nishimura, 2006). Other
types of nonprofit corporations, such as social welfare corporations, private school
corporations, and religious corporations, are governed by different laws.
The second form of nonprofit in Japan is the specified nonprofit corporation (NPO
hōjin), as stipulated by the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities (the Non-
profit Law) of 1998.13 Specified nonprofit corporations are much easier to incorporate
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than traditional nonprofit corporations because there are fewer government regula-
tions. According to the statistics of the Cabinet Office of Japan, over 40,000 specified
nonprofit corporations were in operation throughout the country at the end of June
2010. This figure shows the rapid growth of new types of nonprofits since the enact-
ment of the Nonprofit Law.
Third, unlike in Korea, the Local Autonomy Law of Japan clearly prescribes the
authorization of local self-governing bodies as legal corporations (see table 3). Another
difference in the contracting systems of the two countries is Japan’s “designated manager
system” for managing public facilities. It was introduced in 2004 after the revision of
the Local Autonomy Law of Japan, which allows local governments to choose private
organizations to run their facilities (Research Institute of Construction and Economy,
2005).14 The designated manager system in public facilities has often been used in
recent years to lower public expenditures and improve the quality of services, because
most local governments have been confronted with heavy financial problems. Accord-
ing to a survey by the MIC, 70,022 (59 percent) public facilities, such as museums,
public halls, sports centers, and volunteering support centers, have been contracted out
under the designated manager system as of 2009.
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Table 3. Nonprofits in Social Service Contracting in Japan15
Type Legal basis Number
Public interest corporations Civil Code 23,856
Specified nonprofit corporations Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities 36,601
Authorized local self-governing bodies Local Autonomy Law 22,050
Source: National Tax Agency of Japan, 2009.
13. The emergence of the nonprofit movement has been influenced particularly by the growing
public interest in voluntary activities after the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 and the
enactment of the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities of 1998. This law created
a new category of incorporated organizations for nonprofit and voluntary activities and
enabled civic groups to acquire a legal personality known as the specified nonprofit corpo-
ration (Pekkanen, 2003).
14. Before the revision, management of these public facilities could not be delegated to private
enterprises or nonprofit organizations except in the case of local governments or private
corporations founded with shares from governments. Public facilities in Japan were man-
aged by the local government itself or by foundations like those of Korea.
15. Public interest corporations related to social service contracting in Japan can be categorized
into private school corporations (n=7,806), social welfare corporations (n=18,910), and
religious corporations (n=182,709) as of 2009 (National Tax Agency of Japan, 2009).
DATA AND METHODS
Data Collection Method
This study used both pilot surveys and full-scale surveys with managers of municipal
governments, managers of contractors, and local residents in both Korea and Japan.
Convenience sampling and interview survey methods were used for the pilot surveys,
and convenience and quota sampling and mail or e-mail survey methods for the full-
scale surveys.
Pilot Surveys
Pilot surveys were conducted jointly from late 2008 to early 2009 with three types
of respondents: managers of municipal governments, managers of nonprofit contrac-
tors, and local residents.16 The managers of municipal governments and nonprofit con-
tractors were defined as the people in charge of nonprofit contracting-out in municipal
governments and nonprofit facilities respectively. Local residents were defined as peo-
ple who not only reside in a particular place for an extended period, but also collabo-
rate with nonprofits or municipal governments in the system or processes of nonprofit
social service contracting-out. These three types of respondent were selected for the
survey because they are all involved in contracting processes through networks, and
all three perspectives are important.
We used convenience sampling methods to select five cities (si) or counties (gu) in
Korea (Seocho-gu, Suwon-si, Saha-gu, Gyeongju-si, and Gumi-si) and six cities (shi)
in Japan (Ena, Matsumoto, Miyazaki, Tamana, Kobe, and Hadano).17 We drew small
samples for this preliminary step of examining topics and testing questionnaire items.
Although these samples were drawn by non-probability sampling methods because of
time and cost constraints and were not very representative, we attempted to strengthen
sample representativeness by using quota sampling methods. Specifically, we asked
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16. Based on the provisions of the Constitution and the Local Autonomy Law, Korea and
Japan each have three levels of government: national, prefectural, and municipal. This article
focuses on the municipal level.
17. Seocho-gu is located in Seoul metropolitan city, Suwon-si in Gyeonggi province near
Seoul city, Saha-gu in Busan city, and Gyeongju-si and Gumi-si in Gyeongsangbuk-do in
Korea. Ena is located in Gifu prefecture, Matsumoto in Nagano prefecture, Miyazaki in
Miyazaki prefecture, Tamana in Kumamoto prefecture, Kobe in Hyogo prefecture, and
Hadano in Kanagawa prefecture in Japan. Ena and Matsumoto are in the Chubu region,
Miyazaki and Tamana in the Kyushu region, Kobe in the Kansai region, and Hadano in the
Kanto region.
the managers of Seoul metropolitan city and Kanagawa prefecture to select appropriate
samples in advance, and then, considering their recommendations, we selected our
samples, which appeared to be typical cases of nonprofit social service contracting-
out. Next, we conducted interview surveys with all three types of respondents. Since
the pilot surveys were conducted at a preliminary stage, in-depth interviews served as
a better way of getting specific and detailed data about our topics and correcting for
errors pertaining to all the questionnaire items.
In the pilot surveys, by using in-depth interviews, we were able to collect informa-
tion related to several nonprofit contracting practices and experiences within the
municipal governments, and also related to the relationship between municipal gov-
ernments, nonprofit contractors, and local residents in both countries. Of course, some
common elements between the two countries were observed in the relationship
between municipal governments and nonprofit contractors. For example, features of
nonprofit social service contracting-out—such as personnel, financial infrastructure,
and informational infrastructure—were similar in both countries. However, we could
also observe several differences between the two countries, especially in regards to the
relationship between local residents’ organizations and municipal governments or
nonprofit contractors.
The most striking differences between the two countries derived from differences
in local self-government. A local self-governing body in Korea cannot serve as a con-
tractor for social service provision, because it cannot qualify as a juristic person under
Korean law. But in Japan, local self-governing bodies can be considered juristic per-
sons, and thus serve as social service contractors, as long as they have received accredi-
tation from the head of the local government, due to a revision of the Local Autonomy
Law in 1990.18
Therefore, prominent examples of the collaborative relationship between municipal
governments and local self-governing bodies functioning as contractors were observed
only in Japan. However, we could observe other types of local residents’ participation
in the systems of nonprofit social service contracting in both countries. For example,
local residents’ participation in governance mechanisms, open meetings, and local res-
idents’ involvement as volunteers occurred frequently in both countries.
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18. We looked for several kinds of self-governing bodies organized by local residents in both
countries. In Korea, resident autonomy committees, tong-ban bodies, Saemaul Movement
organizations, and other resident committees, as well as resident voluntary organizations
functioning as service users in the system of nonprofit social service contracting-out were
surveyed. In Japan, self-governing bodies such as ji-chi-kai and cho-nai-kai were surveyed.
Full-Scale Surveys
After the revision of the pilot survey questionnaires, we designed three full-scale
survey questionnaires: municipal government questionnaires, nonprofit contractor
questionnaires, and local resident questionnaires. Full-scale surveys were conducted
from 2009 to 2010 in both countries.
The respondents in the two countries were quite different in respect to the local
self-governing bodies. Based on the results of the pilot survey, we were able to catego-
rize four representative types of local residents’ participation in the system of nonprof-
it social service contracting-out: (1) inclusion of local residents themselves as mem-
bers of nonprofit contractors, (2) participation of local residents in governance mecha-
nisms of nonprofit contracting facilities, such as advisory committees, (3) open meet-
ings between local residents and nonprofit contractors or their managers, and (4)
involvement of local residents as volunteers in the system of nonprofit social service
contracting-out.19
To explore the similarities and differences of nonprofit social service contracting
processes and the relationships among municipal governments, nonprofit contractors
and local residents in both countries, full-scale surveys of the managers of municipal
governments were first conducted. In selecting sample municipalities, we used conve-
nience sampling methods in both countries. Seoul metropolitan city and Gyeonggi
province in Korea and Kanagawa and Yamagata prefectures in Japan were chosen to
make comparisons between urban and rural areas.20 Because they were selected by
non-probability sampling methods due to time and cost constraints, we admit that
these samples are not representative enough of the population.
To evaluate the effects of local self-governing bodies’ participation as contractors
in the system of social service contracting-out, and to observe how leading municipali-
ties of prefecture governments cope with contracting practices, we selected parts of
municipalities that had introduced the local autonomy district system and seat cities of
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19. Of these four types of local residents’ participation, the first type only exists in Japan.
Therefore, we decided to only ask Korean respondents about their perceptions related to
the first type of local residents’ participation, and their thoughts on the adoption of this
kind of institution by Korea, and to exclude this from our direct comparative analysis.
20. Municipalities in Seoul metropolitan cities represent the most urban areas in Korea, whereas
municipalities in Gyeonggi province include both urban areas near Seoul in some districts
and rural areas in other districts. In comparison, municipalities in Kanagawa prefecture
represent urban areas near the Tokyo metropolitan, whereas municipalities in Yamagata
prefecture and municipalities that have introduced the local autonomy district system in
other prefectures represent rural areas.
prefecture governments in Japan.21 After determining the scope of sampling for
municipal governments, we then used quota sampling and convenience sampling
methods in both countries. Seoul metropolitan city consisted of 25 self-governing dis-
tricts (gu), and Gyeonggi province consisted of 27 cities (si) and four counties (gun).
Since we decided to select three representative samples for each district in Seoul met-
ropolitan city, and for each city and county in Gyeonggi province, by quota sampling
methods, the total number of sample questionnaires for municipal governments
(n=168) was 75 in Seoul metropolitan city and 93 in Gyeonggi province. The sample
of municipalities in Japan (n=149) was drawn from the following five groups by quota
sampling and convenience sampling methods: 28 cities (shi) in Kanagawa prefecture,
32 cities (shi) in Yamagata prefecture, 28 cities (shi) that have introduced the local
autonomy district system, 33 cities (shi) that are the seats of prefecture governments,
and 28 other municipalities (shi or ku) in Tokyo metropolis and other prefectures.22
To gather data on municipal governments, mail surveys were primarily used in
Korea and e-mail surveys in Japan. Follow-up interviews were conducted in both
countries to inquire about obscure survey responses. To collect the mail or e-mail
address lists of municipal governments in both countries, we searched official web-
sites first and then collected the surveys with the help of public managers of the Health
and Welfare Bureau, the Woman and Family Affairs, the Welfare and Woman’s Policy
Bureau, the Self-Governing Bureau in Seoul metropolitan city and Gyeonggi province
in Korea, and in Kanagawa, Yamagata, and other prefectures in Japan.
Based on these address lists, the first set of questionnaires were mailed or e-mailed to
the managers of municipal governments who were in charge of nonprofit social service
contracting-out. Of the total number of questionnaires in Seoul metropolitan city (75)
and Gyeonggi province (93), 47 and 33 respectively were completed and returned.
The response rate was about 48 percent in Korea.23 In comparison, among 149 munic-
ipalities in Japan, 23 in Kanagawa prefecture, 32 in Yamagata prefecture, 21 in cities
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21. Because most of the municipalities that have introduced the local autonomy district system—
such as Ichinoseki, Uda, Amami, Nobeoka, Oshu, and Okote—had experienced the merger
of municipalities, they are mainly located in rural areas. Kumamoto, Hiroshima, and Aomori
are examples of cities that are seats of prefecture governments, and Hukuoka prefecture
and Miyagi prefecture are parts of other prefectures.
22. In the Japanese case, the total sample included the municipalities whose e-mail addresses
could be found on their websites. For example, among 35 municipalities in Yamagata pre-
fecture, only 32 e-mail addresses could be found. Among 47 seat cities of prefectural gov-
ernments, we could find only 33 e-mail addresses.
23. Based on the fact that each municipal government in Seoul metropolitan city and Gyeonggi
province has already contracted out with nonprofits, we were able to design quota sampling.
that have introduced the local autonomy district system, 25 in cities that are the seats of
prefecture governments, and 14 in Tokyo metropolis and other prefectures completed
and returned surveys. The response rate in Japan was about 77 percent.
Samples of nonprofit contractors and local residents were selected based on the rec-
ommendations of each municipal manager who was included in the municipal govern-
ment samples. Based on these recommendations, we drew the nonprofit contractor sam-
ples and local resident samples by quota sampling in Korea and convenience sampling
in Japan. Samples of contractors employed the same methods as those of municipal gov-
ernments. In addition, mail surveys in Korea and interview surveys in Japan were con-
ducted in order to gather data on nonprofit contractors and local residents (see table 4).
Questionnaire Items and Data Analysis Method
Based on the results of the pilot survey and other survey research (ICMA, 1992,
1997, 2002, 2007; Van Slyke, 2003; Marvel & Marvel, 2007; American State Admin-
istrators Project, 1998), we developed three comprehensive questionnaires; the main
categories of questions are described in table 5. The unit of analysis for the surveys
was the individual contractual relationship between municipal government and private
nonprofit contractor.
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Table 4. Total Questionnaires and Responses
Type of questionnaire
Korea Japan
Questionnaires Responses Questionnaires Responses
Municipal governments 168 80 149 115
Nonprofit contractors 168 57 21 21
Local residents 168 66 21 21
Total 504 203 191 157 
Table 5. Full-Scale Survey Items
Questionnaire Categories of questions
1. Characteristics of contracting-out and nonprofit contractors
Municipal governments 2. Relationship between contractors and local residents
3. Local-self governing environments
Nonprofit contractors
1. Characteristics of contracting-out and nonprofit contractors
2. Relationship between contractors and local residents
1. Main features of local residents as partners in contracting-out
Local residents 2. Relationship between local residents and municipal governments
3. Relationship between local residents and nonprofit contractors 
To ascertain whether there were statistical differences between the two countries in
respondents’ perceptions of the effects of local residents’ participation on service respon-
siveness, we used an independent sample t-test analysis, and verified that statistical dif-
ferences do exist between the municipal managers’ and nonprofit managers’ perceptions.
Results and Findings
This section presents descriptive statistics of three types of survey respondents and
three types of survey results for municipal government questionnaires, nonprofit con-
tractor questionnaires, and local resident questionnaires. In the case of the local resi-
dent survey, it should be noted that there were many differences between the two
countries in types and levels of local residents’ participation. As mentioned earlier,
local self-governing bodies in Korea cannot serve as contractors. For this reason, we
will only present the main features of local residents, and the collaborative relationship
between local residents and municipal governments or nonprofit contractors broadly,
except the direct comparison between the two countries.
Descriptive Statistics of the Respondents
Municipal government and nonprofit contractor surveys showed no significant dif-
ferences between the two countries in age, gender, and the number of service years
concerning social service contracting-out. More than 80 percent of municipal respon-
dents replied that the average number of service years for social service contracting-
out was more than five (see table 6). But a considerable number of nonprofit contrac-
tor respondents (32 percent) replied that the average number of service years for social
service contracting-out was less than five. This result shows that the turnover rate for
nonprofit managers was higher than that of municipal managers (see table 7).
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Table 6. Municipal Managers
Age 20s 30s 40s 50s and over
9.3% 52.3% 32.7% 2.2%
Gender Male Female
41.5% 51.3%
Years Less than 5 5-10 10-15 15-20 More than 20
15.4% 32.3% 13.8% 21.5% 4.6% 
However, several of the demographic variables of the local residents in the two
countries were quite different (see table 8). Korean local resident respondents mainly
included individuals or organizations that participate in the governance mechanisms of
nonprofits, open meetings with nonprofit managers, or volunteer activities in the sys-
tem of nonprofit contracting-out. In contrast, Japanese local resident respondents
mostly consisted of local self-governing bodies that become contractors themselves in
the system of nonprofit contracting-out.
For this reason, we are able to identify distinctions between the two countries in some
of the demographic variables of local residents. First, the majority of local residents in
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Table 7. Nonprofit Contractors
Age 20s 30s 40s 50s and over
7.7% 44.6% 35.4% 7.7%
Gender Male Female
26.1% 72.6%
Years Less than 5 5-10 10-15 15-20 More than 20
32.4% 37.1% 13.8% 11.4% 0.4% 
Table 8. Local Residents
Age 20s 30s 40s 50s and over
Korea 0.0% 4.6% 26.2% 55.4%





Secondary High Technical/junior University/graduate 
school school college school
Korea 0.0% 9.2% 29.2% 46.1%
Japan 0.0% 71.4% 4.8% 23.8%
Occupation Homemaker Retiree Self-employed Other
Korea 9.2% 6.2% 44.6% 26.2%
Japan 9.1% 72.7% 9.1% 9.0%
Income level Low Average High
Korea 16.9% 33.9% 26.1%
Japan 42.9% 47.6% 9.5% 
both countries were over 50 years old, but Korean local residents were slightly younger.
Second, male respondents were more numerous than females in both countries, more
conspicuously so in the Japanese case. Third, the education level was higher among
local resident respondents in Korea. Fourth, nearly half of Korean local resident
respondents were self-employed, but more than 70 percent of Japanese respondents
were retirees. In both, most local resident respondents were in the low- or average-
income group, but more respondents in Korea were in the high-income group.
Municipal Government Survey Results
In the first set of questionnaire items for municipal governments, regarding the char-
acteristics of social service contracting-out and nonprofit contractors, the great majority
of Korean municipal governments chose the main reasons for social service contracting-
out as “improving of the quality of public services” and “using external civic expertise,”
whereas the great majority of Japanese municipal governments selected “reducing gov-
ernment spending and the number of public servants.” More than 10 percent of Korean
municipal government managers agreed that the quality of facility management deterio-
rated after contracting-out, whereas no Japanese municipal government managers
agreed. Korean municipal governments used more varied methods for supervising than
their Japanese counterparts. Both governments had similarities in that management
reports were most frequently used. These results are described in more detail in table 9.
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Table 9. Municipal Managers’ Responses on Contracting-Out and Nonprofit Contractors
The biggest reason for contracting-out:
(1) reducing government spending and number of public servants; (2) improving the quality of public 
services; (3) developing the local economy; (4) expanding residents’ participation in public service 
01 delivery; (5) request from central government; (6) improving responsiveness of service delivery;
(7) expanding public service delivery; (8) using external civic expertise; (9) reducing administrative 
burden of public servants or agency; (10) other
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Korea 12.8% 29.6% 6.4% 3.8% 5.1% 1.3% 6.4% 26.9% 7.7% 0.0%
Japan 60.0% 27.0% 0.9% 3.5% 0.9% 5.2% 0.9% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Kinds of contracting facilities for private nonprofit organizations:
02
(1) facility for the elderly; (2) facility for the handicapped; (3) other social welfare facility such as a 
nursery; (4) sporting facility; (5) other
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 48.3% 45.0% 78.3% 45.0% 18.3%
Japan 72.2% 48.7% 67.8% 51.3% 76.5%
The second part of the municipal government surveys, concerning the relationship
between nonprofit contractors and local residents (see table 10), showed both similarities
and differences in municipal governments’ evaluations of the effect of local residents’
participation on service responsiveness in the system of nonprofit contracting-out.24 In
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The main reason for selecting nonprofit organization as a contractor:
(1) low proposed contract costs; (2) expertise and experience managing the same kind of facilities; 
03 (3) deep involvement in community activities; (4) political connection; (5) contractor’s reputation; 
(6) financial or staff size; (7) demand of local residents; (8) other
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Korea 1.6% 65.7% 20.3% 0.0% 1.6% 4.7% 4.7% 1.4%
Japan 2.7% 57.3% 23.6% 0.0% 0.9% 1.8% 3.6% 11.8%
Quality of facility management provided by nonprofit organization:
04 (1) severely deteriorated; (2) moderately deteriorated; (3) no change; (4) improved; (6) much improved
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 3.4% 8.5% 23.7% 61.0% 3.4%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 35.8% 62.4% 1.8%
Supervising methods by municipal government:
05
(1) physical inspection of the facility; (2) management report; (3) citizen satisfaction survey; 
(4) monitoring the civil appeal; (5) regular meeting with contractor; (6) other
1 2 3 4 5 6
Korea 78.2% 85.7% 58.4% 48.1% 71.4% 67.9%
Japan 41.7% 87.0% 24.3% 40.9% 33.9% 9.6%
Ratings from user satisfaction survey:
06 (1) very low; (2) low; (3) average; (4) good; (5) very good
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 13.3% 30.0% 53.4% 3.3%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 14.7% 76.5% 8.8%
Conditions that nonprofit organizations needed to manage contracting facilities appropriately:
(1) Personnel (number of staff); (2) personnel (capability and expertise of staff); (3) personnel (number
07 of active volunteers); (4) financial strength; (5) cooperation with community associations; (6) use of
grass-roots volunteers; (7) increase of job opportunities; (8) other
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Korea 8.8% 33.1% 7.5% 20.6% 10.6% 8.1% 1.9% 1.9%
Japan 16.1% 33.9% 0.4% 27.8% 8.7% 0.0% 1.7% 2.2% 
24. To measure the managers’ evaluations of municipality governments, the survey used 5-point 
this category, service responsiveness was measured by the average score of two vari-
ables: quality of services and residents’ satisfaction. The most striking difference
between the two countries was that none of the Japanese municipal government respon-
dents disagreed with the effects of all four types of local residents’ participation on ser-
vice responsiveness, while some of the Korean municipal government respondents did
disagree. However, more than 60 percent of both nations’ municipal respondents agreed
that three types of local residents’ participation had a positive effect on service respon-
siveness.
In the last part of the municipal government surveys, concerning the local self-gov-
erning environments of the two countries (see table 11), twice as many Japanese as
Korean respondents agreed that local residents’ organizations have been active for the
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Likert scales, such as 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 =
agree; 5 = strongly agree.
Table 10. Municipal Managers’ Responses on the Relationship between Local Residents and
Nonprofit Contractors
08
Inclusion of local self-governing bodies as nonprofit contractors contributes to more responsive 
social service delivery.
1 2 3 4 5 
(disagree strongly) (disagree) (neutral) (agree) (agree strongly)
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 34.7% 59.2% 6.1%
09
Participation of local residents in the governance mechanisms of the nonprofit contracting-out 
system contributes to more responsive social service delivery.
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 3.0% 15.2% 18.2% 62.1% 1.5%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 36.0% 60.7% 3.4%
10
Open meetings between local residents and nonprofit contractors contribute to more responsive 
social service delivery.
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 8.9% 13.3% 11.1% 66.7% 0.0%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 16.0% 76.6% 7.4%
11
Involvement of local residents as volunteers in the nonprofit contracting-out system contributes to 
more responsive social service delivery.
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 4.5% 0.0% 25.4% 53.7% 16.4%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 29.6% 64.3% 6.1% 
past five years. This suggests that the Korean municipal government respondents have
less faith in the activities of local residents’ organizations to solve community-related
problems than the Japanese.
Nonprofit Contractor Survey Results
The first set of questions for nonprofit contractors addresses the main characteris-
tics of social service contracting-out and nonprofit contractors. Korean respondents
identified 95 percent of their country’s nonprofits as “social welfare corporations” or
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Table 11. Municipal Managers’ Responses on the Local Self-Governing Environment
The level of residential participation in solving community-related problems:
13 (1) very weak; (2) weak; (3) neither strong nor weak; (4) strong; (5) very strong
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 5.3% 54.4% 33.3% 7.0%
Japan 0.9% 3.5% 41.6% 46.9% 7.1%
Types of local residents’ collaborative organizations:
14
(1) community-based organizations; (2) mission-based organizations; (3) organizations established 
by the government which local residents are obliged to join; (4) other
1 2 3 4
Korea 47.4% 14.0% 0.0% 21.8%
Japan 97.4% 27.0% 4.3% 3.5%
Local residents’ organizations have been active during the past five years.
15 (1 = disagree strongly; 5 = agree strongly)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 15.9% 54.0% 28.6% 1.5%
Japan 0.9% 0.9% 38.1% 53.1% 7.1%
Types of relationships between local residents’ collaborative organizations and municipal government:
16
(1) information sharing; (2) informal cooperation; (3) subsidy (not contracting-out); (4) contracting- 
out; (5) full cooperation (organizing committee); (6) other
1 2 3 4 5 6
Korea 58.1% 24.2% 30.6% 29.0% 22.6% 4.8%
Japan 71.3% 30.4% 78.3% 54.8% 26.1% 11.3%
Local residents’ organizations are carrying out their own activities to solve community-related problems.
17 (1 = disagree strongly; 5 = agree strongly)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 2.7% 20.4% 63.7% 13.3%
Japan 4.7% 20.4% 35.9% 35.9% 3.1% 
“public interest institutions,” while Japanese respondents identified a substantial pro-
portion as “specified nonprofit corporations” or “local self-governing bodies.” In this
respect, we can see that more officially established organizations play a central role in
the system of nonprofit social service contracting-out in Korea, whereas smaller com-
munity-level organizations are more active in Japan.
On the question of the most important revenues that they now receive for stable
management of the organization, the great majority of nonprofit contractor respon-
dents in both countries selected “subsidies or grants-in-aid from the government.” The
second choice was “profits from business activities,” which was chosen by a slightly
higher percentage of Korean contractor respondents than Japanese ones. This suggests
that nonprofit contractors were strongly concerned with business activities and their
profits; this tendency was stronger in Korea than in Japan. In both countries, “member
fees and donations” were minor contributors, while the government was the most reli-
able contributor. The results on the question of the revenues that they most hope will
be increased reveal that nonprofit contractors in both countries hoped that the govern-
ment would increase funding, while recognizing the necessity of business profits more
conservatively, and showed relatively little concern regarding membership fees, which
were to be increased.
Regarding types of partnership with municipal government, most Korean respon-
dents chose “subsidy” or “contracting-out,” while almost all Japanese respondents
selected “contracting-out” or “information sharing.” This demonstrate that financial
connections between municipal governments and nonprofit contractors were stronger
in Korea, while non-financial connections such as information sharing were stronger
in Japan. These results are presented in more detail in table 12.
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Table 12. Nonprofit Contractors’ Responses on Contracting-Out and Nonprofit Contractors
Type of organization:
01
(1) Public interest institution; (2) social welfare corporation; (3) specified nonprofit corporation; 
(4) local self-governing body; (5) other
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 27.8% 66.7% 1.9% 0.0% 3.7%
Japan 4.8% 47.6% 23.8% 14.3% 9.5%
There is room for improving facility management by making use of original contracting ideas and 
02
methods.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 61.4% 36.8%
Japan 0.0% 9.5% 19.0% 47.6% 23.8%
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Expertise of nonprofit contractors constitutes an important part of managing the facility.
03 (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 47.4% 45.6%
Japan 0.0% 9.5% 9.5% 66.7% 14.3%
Nonprofit contractors carry out activities that are stipulated in their own statutes for managing 
04
the facility.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 57.9% 36.8%
Japan 14.3% 19.0% 9.5% 52.4% 4.8%
Activities for managing the facility that are stipulated in nonprofit contractors’ own statutes 
05
contribute to more responsive social service delivery.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 0.0% 18.2% 67.3% 14.5%
Japan 0.0% 7.1% 21.4% 71.4% 0.0%
06




Ratings of user satisfaction surveys:
07 (1) very low; (2) bad; (3) average; (4) good; (5) very good
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 83.0% 11.3%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7%
This contract contributes to strengthening the organizational (personnel and financial) foundations 
08
of nonprofit contractors.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 3.5% 5.3% 24.6% 59.6% 7.0%
Japan 0.0% 4.8% 28.6% 52.4% 14.3%
Necessary revenues for stable management of the facility:
09
(1) subsidies or grants-in-aid from the government; (2) membership fees; (3) profits from business 
activities; (4) other
1 2 3 4
Korea 98.2% 24.6% 63.2% 73.7%
Japan 66.7% 14.3% 42.9% 4.8%
The second category of questions in the nonprofit contractor surveys addressed the
relationship between nonprofit contractors and local residents and its effect on service
responsiveness. To the question of whether local residents were included as members
of nonprofit contractors, none of the Korean nonprofit contractor respondents replied
yes, but more than two-thirds of Japanese respondents did. Respondents in both coun-
tries agreed that inclusion of local residents as members of nonprofit contractors con-
tributed to more responsive service delivery, even though that option has not been
introduced in Korea yet. Responses are described in more detail in table 13.
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Preferable revenue for stable management of the facility:
10
(1) subsidies or grants-in-aid from the government; (2) membership fees; (3) profits from business 
activities; (4) other
1 2 3 4
Korea 89.5% 1.8% 36.8% 68.4%
Japan 57.1% 9.5% 38.1% 4.8%
Types of partnership with municipal government:
11
(1) information sharing; (2) informal cooperation; (3) subsidy (not contracting-out); (4) contracting-out; 
(5) full cooperation (organizing committee); (6) other
1 2 3 4 5 6
Korea 64.9% 45.6% 91.2% 92.5% 7.0% 36.8%
Japan 90.5% 23.8% 33.3% 100.0% 19.0% 4.8% 
Table 13. Nonprofit Contractors’ Responses on the Relationship between Local Residents and 
Nonprofit Contractors
12




Inclusion of local residents as members of nonprofit contractors contributes to more responsive 
13
social service delivery.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 86.5% 2.4% 3.5% 7.1%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 60.0% 33.3%
14




Local Resident Survey Results
Questionnaire items addressing local residents were divided into three parts. How-
ever, we will not compare all survey results between the two countries directly here,
because the two countries’ respondents differed. Most Japanese respondents were
members of local self-governing bodies, so some questions at the organizational level
were developed only for them.
The participation rate of local residents in the system of nonprofit social service
contracting-out was reported as more than 80 percent in both countries. More than
two-thirds of Korean respondents agreed that local residents have a close relationship
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Participation of local residents in the governance mechanisms of nonprofits contributes to more 
15
responsive social service delivery.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 4.5% 9.1% 68.2% 18.2%
Japan 0.0% 6.7% 26.7% 53.3% 13.3%
16




Open meetings between local residents and nonprofit managers contribute to more responsive 
17
social service delivery.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 2.5% 2.5% 45.0% 7.5%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 17.6% 70.6% 11.8%





Involvement of local residents as volunteers in the system of nonprofit social service contracting-out 
19
contributes to more responsive social service delivery.
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
1 2 3 4 5
Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 51.9% 48.1%
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 81.3% 12.5% 
with their municipal government; they selected “information sharing” and “informal
cooperation” as the most frequent types of partnership with municipal government.
Japanese respondents selected “information sharing” and “contracting-out.” While
“participation as volunteers” was most frequently selected in Korea, “periodic meet-
ings” was most frequently selected in Japan. Questions in this part of the survey are
detailed in table 14.
Independent Sample T-test Results
To assess statistical differences between Korean and Japanese respondents in the
mean scores of each type of survey response, we conducted an independent sample t-
test analysis. We excluded all the local resident survey results in the direct t-test com-
parison analysis, because of the conspicuous differences between respondents in the
two countries. We also excluded the first type of participation of local residents, since
local self-governing bodies are only able to serve as nonprofit contractors in Japan.
By allocating one to five points based on the responses (strongly disagree to
strongly agree), we were able to measure the mean values of the municipal govern-
ments’ and nonprofit contractors’ responses as shown in tables 15 and 16. In both
tables, the fact that all the mean values are greater than three reveals that the managers
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Table 14. Local Resident Questionnaire Items
01 Participation rate; number of executives (only in the case of organizations)
02 Features of active members: age, gender, education level, income level, occupation
03 Relationship with municipal government (from very weak to very strong on a five-point scale)
04
Types of partnership with municipal government: information sharing, informal cooperation, 
subsidy, contracting-out, full cooperation, other
Type of participation in the system of nonprofit social service contracting-out: inclusion as a 
05
member of a nonprofit contractor, participation in governance mechanism, periodic meetings to 
exchange information and opinions concerning the management of the facility, participation as 
volunteers
06
Inclusion of local residents as members of nonprofit contractors contributes to more responsive 
social service delivery. (disagree or agree on a 5-point scale)
07
Participation of local residents in the governance mechanisms of nonprofits contributes to more 
responsive social service delivery. (disagree or agree on a 5-point scale)
08
Open meetings between local residents and nonprofit contractors contribute to more responsive 
social service delivery. (disagree or agree on a 5-point scale)
09
Involvement of local residents as volunteers in the system of nonprofit contracting-out contributes 
to more responsive social service delivery. (disagree or agree on a 5-point scale) 
of municipal governments and nonprofit contractors in both countries perceived the
positive effect of the three types of participation by local residents on responsiveness.
As reported in table 15, the respondents from Korean municipal governments
obtained a lower mean score than their Japanese counterparts, except for the voluntary
involvement item. As such, the respondents from Korean municipal governments had
more negative perceptions regarding the effect of participation in the governance
mechanisms of nonprofits, and of open meetings with local residents, on service
responsiveness. Also, the results indicate that there was a strong statistically signifi-
cant difference between the mean values of open meetings (p = 0.001).25
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25. In the case of municipal government surveys, the number of service years of municipal
managers could affect their evaluation of the effects of local residents’ participation. To
verify whether this was the case, we conducted a one-way ANOVA test using the Korean 
Table 15. Independent T-test Results for Municipal Managers
Variables Country N Mean t Sig. (two-tailed)
Participation in governance Korea 66 3.44
-1.918 0.058
mechanisms Japan 89 3.67
Open meetings with local Korea 45 3.36
-3.480 0.001**
residents Japan 94 3.91
Involvement of local residents Korea 67 3.78
0.089 0.929
as volunteers Japan 98 3.77
Equal variances not assumed.
* Significant at 0.001.
Table 16. Independent T-test Results for Nonprofit Contractors
Variables Country N Mean t Sig. (two-tailed)
Participation in governance Korea 44 4.00
1.252 0.216
mechanisms Japan 15 3.73
Open meetings with local Korea 23 4.00
0.315 0.754
residents Japan 17 3.94
Involvement of local residents Korea 54 4.48
3.218 0.003*
as volunteers Japan 16 4.06
Equal variances not assumed.
* Significant at 0.005.
Table 16 shows the opposite results when compared to those of local governments.
Korean nonprofit respondents obtained a higher mean score than their Japanese coun-
terparts in nonprofit respondent surveys. This suggests that Korean nonprofit respon-
dents have more positive perceptions related to the effect of the participation in gover-
nance mechanisms of nonprofits, open meetings with local residents, and the involve-
ment of local residents as volunteers on service responsiveness than the Japanese
respondents. There was also a statistically significant difference in the mean values of
the volunteer involvement variable (p = 0.003).
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Focusing on local residents’ participation as an important new factor of service
responsiveness in the system of nonprofit social service contracting-out, we first
attempted to show what the common elements and differences were in the relation-
ships among municipality governments, nonprofit contractors, and local residents in
Japan and Korea by using three types of survey data.
Many common elements are shared by the two countries in nonprofit social service
contracting-out. In the relationship between municipal governments and nonprofit
contractors, the contractors were selected based on their expertise and experience in
similar kinds of facilities, and the capability and expertise of nonprofit staff and the
financial strength of the facilities were the most necessary conditions for nonprofit
organizations to manage the facilities appropriately. Municipal governments in both
countries have also made use of various methods for supervising the contractors’
responsiveness, such as management reports, regular meetings, and physical inspec-
tions. Nonprofit contractors in the two countries have mostly depended upon govern-
ment funding. Profits from business activities formed the next greatest portion of their
income and were also mentioned as a source that they preferred to be increased, while
membership fees received the least attention as a revenue resource.
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municipal government survey data. The Japanese cases could not be analyzed because of
the lack of data. Korean municipal government respondents were divided into two groups:
those who had served less than 10 years and more than 10 years. The descriptive statistics
and the one-way ANOVA test results are summarized in Appendix Table 1. The results
show that the higher the number of service years of municipal managers, the lower the mean
values of their perception of all three effects of local residents’ participation on service
responsiveness. However, there were no significant differences between the two groups
statistically. Therefore, further research should be carried out after extracting sufficient
compatible data.
In spite of their similarities in many respects, we found some differences in the
relationships between municipal governments and nonprofit vendors. Though man-
agement reports were most frequently used in both countries, Korean municipal gov-
ernments used more varied methods for supervising contractors’ service responsive-
ness than their Japanese counterparts did, such as physical inspection, citizen satisfac-
tion surveys, and regular meetings with the contractors. Also, Korean nonprofits were
more frequently managed by the specific statutes of the facilities than were Japanese
nonprofits. This is because local self-governing bodies that were community-based
organizations without a strong mission were included as nonprofit contractors in
Japan. In addition, whereas subsidy was the most common type of partnership
between government and vendors in Korea, information sharing was the most com-
mon type in Japan. This means that financial connections between municipal govern-
ments and nonprofit vendors were relatively important in Korea, while non-financial
connections were more important in Japan.
Relationships between nonprofit contractors and local residents in the two coun-
tries were quite different, because of the distinct local self-governing environments in
the system of nonprofit social service contracting-out. The biggest difference between
the two countries is that while Japanese local self-governing bodies can themselves be
contractors and actively participate in the system of nonprofit social service contract-
ing-out, especially in rural areas, Korean local self-governing bodies can almost never
be contractors themselves, although they can actively participate in the system of non-
profit social service contracting-out. As a result, we might conclude that Korean
municipal governments and nonprofit contractors were loosely connected and collabo-
rated with local residents as partners in the contracting system for more responsive
service delivery, while Japanese municipal governments and nonprofit contractors
were more closely connected and collaborated with local self-governing bodies
throughout the entire contracting system for a more responsive service delivery.
After conducting pilot surveys and full-scale surveys with the three types of
respondents in both countries, we identified and categorized the current types of local
residents’ participation in nonprofit social service contracting-out into inclusion of
local residents themselves as members of nonprofit contractors, participation of local
residents in the governance mechanisms of nonprofit facilities, open meetings between
local residents and nonprofit contractors, and involvement of local residents as volun-
teers in nonprofit facilities.
Finally, using an independent sample t-test analysis, we verified that Japanese
municipal managers had more positive and statistically significant perceptions of the
effects of open meetings with local residents for more responsive service delivery than
the Korean respondents, and Korean nonprofit managers had more positive and statis-
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tically significant perceptions of the effects of involvement as volunteers for more
responsive service delivery than the Japanese respondents.
This study has several limitations attributable to the problem of perception data,
small sample size, particularly in terms of the contractors and the local residents in
Japan, and the need for a more specific design to test the effect of local residents’ par-
ticipation on service responsiveness. In this study, we only observed the respondents’
individual perceptions or subjective evaluations of the effect of local residents’ partic-
ipation on service responsiveness. Future research is needed that collects larger sam-
ples and considers the characteristics of the respondents, such as number of service
years, in order to better generalize the specific results. Furthermore, hard data or sepa-
rately collected data on all the variables would be useful in order to test the effect of
local residents’ participation on service responsiveness.
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